A principal aim of this paper is to convince friends and critics of deconstruction that they have overlooked two crucial aspects of Derrida's work, namely, his rearticulation of the concept of experience and his account of the experience of undecidability as an ordeal. This is important because sensitivity to Derrida's emphasis on the ordeal of undecidability and his rearticulation of the concept of experience-a rearticulation that is already underway in his early engagement with Husserl and continued in later work-necessitates a rethinking of what the ‗experience of undecidability' entails. Rather than signalling a withdrawal from politics or a normatively impotent ethics of ‗mere openness to the other,' Derrida's account of the experience of undecidability not only points to a fundamental aspect of our basic ethical experience, but also leads to a number of ethico-political demands, which I summarise as the demand to maintain an ethos of interruption.
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Laclau's reading brings into view two dimensions of deconstruction: the promise as a structural feature of all experience, whose openness to the coming of the other leaves it without content (TJ, 73) , and the ethico-political injunctions of a ‗democracy to come' which Derrida links to the classical notion of emancipation (TJ, 75) . While Laclau endorses the former movement, which does away with any teleological eschatology and reveals the terrain of structural undecidability, he is less convinced by the latter move insofar as the classical notion of emancipation-which ‗Derrida is not at all prepared to put…into question' (TJ, 75)-requires the synthesis of a series of contents and is thus ‗intimately connected to the teleological eschatology that Derrida is deconstructing ' (TJ, 76) . Summarising this position we can say that the problem that arises for Laclau is the following: how is one to conceive the transition between the contentless openness as a general structure of experience and any emancipatory ethico-political contents?
While Laclau is certainly not dismissing the latter, his claim is that they remain incompatible with the former. Derrida seems to want his promise and to keep it. That is to say, he wants both the radical openness of a promise without content and the fulfilled ethico-political contents of the classical emancipatory project (linked to democracy).
For Laclau this problem only arises if one makes the ‗illegitimate transition' (TJ, 77) from the ‗ontological' position of constitutive openness and structural undecidability to an ethico-political injunction that necessarily commits one to a particular ethico-political orientation. ‗Undecidabil-ity', argues Laclau, ‗should be literally taken as that condition from which no course of action necessarily follows. This means that we should not make it the source of any concrete decision in the ethical or political sphere' (TJ, 78). However, unlike critics who make a similar point (such 5 as Thomas McCarthy and Nancy Fraser), 7 Laclau does insist that deconstruction has ‗important consequences for both ethics and politics ' (TJ, 78) . Deconstruction, according to Laclau, ‗makes possible a crucial turn in Political Theory' (DPH, 48) , and it does so by showing that the political is the instituting moment of society, a contingent act not predetermined by some underlying logic. And the flip side of this politico-discursive production of the social is that society remains structurally incomplete because ultimately no contingent act of institution is fully achievable. It remains undecidable. Borrowing Husserlian language, we can say that by widening the field of structural undecidability deconstruction reactivates the contingent moment of decision that underlies any sedimented set of social relations, thus clearing the way for further political decisions. 8 As Laclau puts it:
Deconstruction is primarily a political logic in the sense that, by showing the structural undecidability of increasingly larger areas of the social, it also expands the area of operation of the various moments of political institution. However, Laclau is quick to add a sobering note to those wishing to get a political message out of deconstruction. The above quote continues:
This does not imply that…one can derive, from deconstructionist premises, a decision about concrete political arrangements in a particular situation…Theoretical and political arguments that take deconstruction as their starting point can go in many directions (DPH, 58) .
By widening the terrain of structural undecidability deconstruction does not furnish one with any particular ethico-political guidance but for Laclau it does provide us with ‗one of the most powerful tools at hand for thinking strategically' (TJ, 81-82).
We can summarise Laclau's position in the following way: Derrida's talk of an openness to the other that is inscribed within the very structure of experience leaves it without determinable content. This is good news because (i) it does away with all teleology and eschatology and (ii) it reactivates the contingency of sedimented practices and thereby extends the terrain of structural undecidability to larger areas of social relations. Precisely because undecidability is inherent in constitutive openness, however, the kind of political moves that take place on this undecidable terrain cannot be determined by any ethico-political injunction. Therefore from deconstruction one cannot derive any ethico-political injunctions. Deconstruction leaves the field wide open.
As lucid as Laclau's argument is, I will try and show that this reading of deconstruction fails to appreciate the significance of the concept of experience in Derrida's work and overlooks Derrida's insistence on the ‗ordeal' of undecidability. As we will see, sensitivity to these two aspects of Derrida's account leads to an understanding of ‗experience of undecidability' from which a number of ethico-political injunctions emerge.
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II. Reactivating the Concept of Experience
Before we begin, however, a doubt may be raised about the very appeal to the concept of experience. Surely for Derrida the concept of ‗experience' is a thoroughly metaphysical concept and one he would be reluctant to appeal to determined as it is by the theme of presence. In Of Grammatology, for example, Derrida writes,
As for the concept of experience, it is most unwieldy here…it belongs to the history of metaphysics and we can only use it under erasure (sous rature). ‗Experience' has always designated the relationship with a presence.
9
And similarly in -Violence and Metaphysics‖ he asks,
Has not the concept of experience always been determined by the metaphysics of presence?
Is not experience always an encountering of irreducible presence?
10
This seems to be particularly bad news for any account of Derrida's work that seeks to emphasise the concept of experience. Indeed, isn't this proposed reading of deconstruction yet another symptom of the very disease that Derrida is so keen to diagnose? And yet in his later work Derrida seems to emphasise ‗experience' with great abandon, whether it is ‗the experience of the 
13
Despite appearances, this emphasis on experience in the latter work is not some sudden leap or abrupt about-face but rather a rearticulation of an alternative concept of experience. When Derrida opts for the word ‗experience' to describe his own work he crucially adds ‗[t]he word experience, once dusted off and reactivated a little, so to speak, is perhaps the one I would choose' (Ps, 207) . This dusting off and reactivating, I want to claim, is already under way in the earlier work. That is to say, experience under erasure was never the whole story.
We can get a better understanding of this if we take a brief detour into Derrida's engagement with Husserl, for it is in response to the phenomenological attempt to uncover the universal form of experience, or the transcendentality of what Husserl terms the ‗living present', that Derrida will suspect the concept of experience of failing to take into account the movement of différance and participating in the reduction of the trace. But at the very moment when Derrida raises this 9 suspicion against the concept of experience a ‗to the extent that' introduces an opening in which the possibility/promise of an alternative concept of experience can already be heard:
To the extent that the concept of experience in general-and of transcendental experience, in
Husserl in particular-remains governed by the theme of presence it participates in the movement of the reduction of the trace (OG, 61-2 -my emphasis).
Despite this suspicion, the possibility of another concept of experience, opened up by this ‗to the extent that', begins to emerge in Derrida's early work, a rearticulated concept of experience that concept, a concept that seeks to reveal within the metaphysics of presence difference and temporalization (OG, 60) such that it would breach the immediacy of any self-relation or pure presence, not as some belated empirical accident from without but ‗from within and from the very beginning'.
We will see shortly why Derrida thinks this is so, however, we can anticipate this a little if we focus for a moment on ‗arche-writing' and ask ourselves why Derrida chooses this term. What work is it doing? By referring experience to arche-writing Derrida is seeking to generalise the difference, mediation and non-presence associated with writing (in the narrow sense) to the possibility of any appearing or presenting as such. That is to say, by rearticulating experience as arche-writing Derrida is going to argue that all experience is in fact conditioned by those very features that are seen as characterising writing. The ‗writing' in arche-writing refers us to this dif-ference and non-presence, while the ‗arche' seeks to emphasise that these are not derivative of some pure presence but are in fact ‗originary'. This is clear from the 1968 essay ‗Différance'
where Derrida introduces arche-writing through a discussion of signification: and irreducibly synthesis of marks…that I propose to call arche-writing.
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These themes will be explored shortly when we take up the discussion of Husserl, but what I want to highlight here is the move Derrida is making with the introduction of arche-writing: it is an attempt to show that the difference and non-presence associated with writing in fact conditions every experience ‗from the beginning'. In making this ‗experience as arche-writing' move, Derrida is claiming that difference and non-presence are not to be understood as a modification of a simple presence but as that through which presence itself appears.
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In Speech and Phenomena the rearticulation of experience as arche-writing attempts to bring out or ‗make appear' an ‗irreducible nonpresence…or nonself-belonging of the living present'.
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It will not be a question of rejecting experience or dismissing presence but a mutual rearticulation and transformation of both that will help us ‗recognise' the ‗irreducible void' of nonpresence ‗on the basis of which the security of presence is decided and raised up'. 17 What Derrida is concerned with here is to bring before us or make appear the point of insecurity within metaphysics, where the discourse of presence can no longer assure itself of its possibility. Anticipating things a little, we can say that SP would be concerned with, among other things, an experience that would make appear the ‗nonpresence and difference at the heart of self-presence'
(SP, 15).
18
Leaving aside the question of whether one could in fact recognise nonpresence or make it appear, we can see Derrida trying to bring out this point of insecurity when discussing Husserl's claim that in the silent soliloquy of inner life we do not communicate or indicate anything to ourselves for our meaning-acts and expressions ‗are themselves experienced by us at that very moment' (cited SP, 49). Here Husserl is attempting to exclude from the inner monologue of solitary mental life mediation, alterity, difference, nonpresence-in short all that is implied by the term ‗indication'-in order to hold on to the unmediated self-presence of lived-experience which assures the purity of ideality and secures the inner certitude of transcendental experience. By arguing that the sign is always already caught up in a structure of repetition and representation, which is not a reduplication that befalls a simple presence but is itself primordial (SP, 7 n.6), and that This reference to arche-writing, echoing the ‗experience as arche-writing' remark in OG,
should not mislead one into thinking that Derrida is concerned only with the system of linguistic differences and traces. If this were the case one would still be faced with the question that Derrida himself raises in the essay -Différance‖: ‗But can one not conceive of a presence, and of a presence to itself of the subject before speech and signs, a presence to itself of the subject in a silent and intuitive consciousness?' (M, 16) In response Derrida insists that ‗this arche-writing is at work at the origin of sense' (SP, 85). Derrida's point here is not simply that the speaking subject-whether it be in dialogue with an other or the inner discourse with oneself-could not be present to itself without inscribing itself within a system of linguistic differences or indicative detours, but the deeper point that the presence to itself of the subject, the self-identity of living consciousness itself, emerges through the movement of the trace and différance and not the reverse. ‗This movement of différance,' writes Derrida, ‗is not something that happens to a tran-14 scendental subject; it produces a subject' (SP, 82). While experience would be impossible outside the form of presence, presence itself is constituted through the trace structure and the movement of différance. The experience of presence and self-identity would thus be an experience of the trace and alterity. This ‗irreducible void,' as Derrida referred to it above, is nothing other than arche-writing:
it is this constitution of the present, as an ‗originary' and irreducibly nonsimple (and therefore, stricto sensu nonoriginary) synthesis or marks, or traces of retentions and protentions…that I propose to call arche-writing…or différance (M, 16).
In the formulation ‗experience as arche-writing' we can recognise an attempt to make appear ‗an irreducible non-presence or nonself-belonging of the living present' (SP, 6), the divergence of the movement of différance that opens up the pure immanence of experience to reveal the alterity ‗at the heart of self-presence' (SP, 15).
Experience as interruption
This rearticulation of the concept of experience opens up the way for Derrida to re-deploy this concept in the latter work. No longer understood simply in terms of a metaphysics of presence, ‗experience' now comes to be understood as that which opens up the security of self-sameness and self-identity to the insecurity of difference and alterity. No longer requiring the constraints of quote marks, experience now comes to be understood as a passage to those undecidable moments variously described as ‗the aporia', ‗the impossible', ‗the perhaps', ‗the event' and so forth (AP, 19 is an interruption that happens to a subject, beyond its control and mastery.
Before we begin to approach this ‗experience as interruption' something must be said about the notion of interruption, for talk of interruption, of ‗happening to', would seem to presuppose an already existing subject present to itself and this was something that the rearticulation of experience as arche-writing sought to question. Hence we need to get clear about the order of priority.
To recall, what experience as arche-writing seeks to show is that just as there is no linguistic meaning without the indicative detour through the mediation of the sign, likewise there is no subjectivity, no self-relation, without the movement of différance. As Derrida puts it:
The movement of différance is not something that happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a subject. Auto-affection is not a modality of experience that characterizes a being that would already be itself (autos). It produces sameness as self-relation within selfdifference; it produces sameness as the non-identical (SP, 82).
That is to say, difference and non-presence do not come to befall some pre-existing subject relating to itself in a pure auto-affection; rather subjectivity issues forth through the spacing and tem-porisation that opens up the experience of auto-affection. Experience as interruption needs to be understood as part of this story.
Derrida's reactivation of the concept of experience, in terms of experience as arche-writing, attempts to make appear the constitutive difference and nonself-belonging at the heart of selfidentity. But this attempt to ‗make appear' involves the attempt to show that the alterity within self-presence does not appear. As Derrida emphasises, ‗[a]ll the concepts of metaphysics…cover up the strange -movement‖ of this difference' (SP, 85; OG, 43, 166) . Through the concept of pure auto-affection, for example, the immediate presence to itself of the subject is taken as a primordial starting point and what this covers over is that subjectivity is itself an effect of the movement of différance: ‗the order of subjectivity belongs…to the order of the constituted' as Derrida puts it (SP, 84, n.9). ‗Experience as interruption', then, is to be understood as an interruption of the assurance of a subject that takes itself to be immediately given to itself in a pure interiority of ownness. It is an interruption in the sense that it makes appear the more ‗originary' experience as arche-writing, revealing the subject's dependency on difference, mediation, the What is reactivated through this ‗experience as interruption' is the constitutive difference and nonself-belonging at the heart of self-identity, the ‗experience as arche-writing' that is concealed beneath the security of self-presence. Through this experience as interruption the unfamiliar erupts into the domain of the familiar, soliciting (M, 21) the domesticated security and athomeness of the subject. It is for this reason that Derrida writes: ‗An event [and here we can now read experience] is always traumatic' (WA, 136).
Although we do not get any phenomenological account of experience as interruption, in the way, for example, that we do get a phenomenological description of experience as arche-writing in Derrida's discussion of hearing oneself speak (SP, chapter 6), this reference to ‗traumatic' may point the way a little. Pausing for a moment to see what this might entail will prove useful in bringing out what many readings of Derrida, and Laclau's in particular, seem to pass over.
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At first sight this reference to trauma may seem a little odd, yet it is one that Derrida returns to. It is repeated a little later when, discussing Paul de Man's association of the unforseeability of the event with the suffering of the subject, Derrida goes on to radicalise de Man's point:
By reason of the unforseeability, this irreducible and inappropriable exteriority for the subject of experience, every event as such is traumatic. Even an event experienced as a ‗happy' one …An event is traumatic or it does not happen (WA, 159).
No doubt this is a rather idiosyncratic use of the word ‗trauma'-one can hardly imagine a ‗happy' trauma. One way of understanding Derrida's generalising of ‗trauma' is to see it as an attempt to bring out the sense in which for an event to arrive one must be exposed to some outside, vulnerable to an unforeseeable arriving (WA, 159; PF 68; R, 152; AP, 12) that is beyond one's control or mastery, such that the subject of this experience is affected or-betterdisturbed. In ‗disturb' one can hear not only interruption but also dispossession 22 and in both a relation to an outside, to the coming of a who or what, is implied. Saying that an event is traumatic in that it disturbs is to suggest an experience of interruption and dispossession, an arriving that throws into disorder (disturbāre) my subjectivity. where Vellemen points to this being exposed (albeit with differing reasons and for different purposes) in his description of love as that which arrests our tendencies toward emotional self-protection from another person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by him. Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other.
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The philosophical assumptions behind this remark, and the concerns guiding Vellemen here, are very different from Derrida's and the formulation itself would no doubt be questioned by the latter. However, when Vellemen talks of one being ‗arrested' or ‗disarmed' by this experience, he seems to be pointing to a certain loss of mastery that we have been highlighting. 24 We can see this by the way in which Vellemen's phenomenological sketch of love changes the perspective through which one approaches this experience, from a perspective which would see love as an impulse or inclination issuing from a subject out toward something, to one where the subject is itself affected by something, taken by surprise and thrown into a state similar to ‗amazement or awe'.
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Although not expressed in precisely these terms, what Vellemen seems to be describing here is an arriving that not only interrupts a subject (and any attempt to close oneself off from the other), but an arriving that is experienced, if we are to take amazement literally, as a loss of self- Trauma, understood in this way, would not refer to the particular contents of an event; it would not name a particular effect of a particular cause, but the very being-exposed/disturbed of the subject of this experience. When Derrida talks of the experience of love as one where ‗the other…disturbs or effects my own property, my own relation to myself' 27 it is not particular unhappy experiences of love that make this disturbing traumatic-the pain and despair that love may bring with it for example-but the fact the one is exposed, vulnerable, ‗without protection' (AP, 12) to disturbance as such (FWT, 58) . Here one could be ‗happily vulnerable' (FWT, 53).
The ‗trauma' of experience as interruption, then, can be understood in terms of this beingexposed/vulnerable to a disturbance beyond one's control or mastery.
Having fleshed out experience as interruption a little, we see that although it may initially suggest a pre-existing subject in an undisturbed realm of interiority which subsequently comes to be affected by an external difference, it is better understood as that which interrupts the security of 
Undecidability as a formal moment of any decision.
Although often taken to imply an oscillating indecisiveness or paralysing uncertainty, undecidability figures in Derrida's work as part of an analysis of the concept of decision. Rather than being something that is opposed to the taking of a decision, undecidability emerges as the condition of any decision. For our purposes here, however, I am not going to explore the radical version of this account in any great detail but will instead focus on how Derrida brings it to bear on ethicopolitical decisions.
In the essay -Force of Law‖ one of the things that Derrida seeks to show is that the relation between law and justice is undecidable because the ‗the decision between just and unjust is never 23 insured by a rule' (FL, 16). If a decision were insured by a pre-existing rule that one merely applies in a given situation, then, for Derrida, we might say that such a decision is legal, that it conforms to law, but not that it is just. For a decision to be a just decision there must be a moment where there is an ‗épokhè of the rule' (FL, 22) , a moment where the law is suspended and a ‗fresh judgement' that ‗re-invents' the law emerges (FL, 17, 23 And given that a decision presupposes freedom and responsibility, and given that the latter would be incompatible with the mere application of a rule or norm, for there to be a decision there must be a moment that is discontinuous with the order of the calculable. As Derrida puts it:
If I know what is to be done, if my theoretical analysis of the situation shows me what is to be done…then there is no moment of decision, simply the application of a body of knowledge, of, at the very least, a rule or norm. For there to be a decision, the decision must be heterogeneous to knowledge as such…otherwise, there is no responsibility (N, 231). If there is to be a decision then there must be a moment where one is no longer following the consequence of some determinate knowledge or rule, a ‗leap' that ‗takes off…and…frees itself' from any calculable process (PF, 69), for it is here that one's freedom and responsibility is engaged. Such a leap is the ‗structurally necessary moment' (FL, 20) of undecidability within the very concept of decision.
But this formal account of undecidability seems to return us back to the structural reading we have been trying to resist. While Derrida is engaged in giving such an account-at various moments he reminds us of this: ‗All that I am saying here is nothing but the modest analysis of the concept of decision', an analysis which points to something in ‗the very structure of any decision' (N, 232)-his insistence on the ‗ordeal' of undecidability seems to go beyond this. It certainly goes beyond the kind of structuralist reading we have been considering for ‗ordeal' suggests a trying, protracted experience that one undergoes and this is precisely what the structuralist reading leaves out. We might say that undecidability without the ordeal gives us only half of the story.
If we were to see undecidability simply in terms of this formal account one would be left wondering, ‗what's the big ordeal in all of this'? Again Derrida leaves us with work to do here for we 25 never get any fully worked out account of what kind of experience ‗ordeal' is referring us to.
However, a brief look at the way in which Derrida's characterises the moment of decision does suggest that, unlike ‗trauma', ‗ordeal' is pointing to a difficult experience. There is no happy ordeal. I also hope to show that a particular understanding of undecidability, which is not captured in the formal account, is also suggested.
The ordeal of undecidability
Derrida tells us that the moment of decision, of making the leap, is an ‗anxiety ridden moment'
(FL, 20), a ‗madness' in which we find ourselves confronted with a ‗terrible choice' (PM, 11) and the necessity of having to act in a ‗night of non-knowledge and non-rule' (FL, 26) . Here, at the ‗crossroads of chance and necessity' (PF, 30), we are ‗given over in darkness to the exception of singularity without rule' (PF, 219), to a ‗test' or ‗endurance' (AP, 19; GD, 5) where we are ‗never at peace' but continually ‗haunted' (PM, 20; PF, 219) by the possibility that we have gone wrong. Alone in this darkness, faced with decisions ‗that I alone will have to answer for' (GD, 91), there are no principles, no system or dialectical story that can conjure away the ‗ghost of the undecidable' (FL, 24) and relieve me of this ordeal. Here ‗remorse'-understood in the sense of ‗never being happy with the decision'-is ‗irreducible'. As Derrida rather darkly puts it: ‗a decision has to be paid for' (PM, 23) . This is quite a disquieting picture. Is Derrida really offering nothing more than the modest analysis of the concept of decision? Is this the only story that one could tell of the moment of decision? From the formal account of undecidability as the structurally necessary moment of making a leap that breaks with existing laws and rules, must we necessarily undergo a terrible ordeal? Could we not experience this leap as a moment of freedom, where a space opens up for creative acts that break free of determined laws and structures? Indeed, wouldn't this moment of 26 deciding without any determining ground be, as Laclau puts it, ‗like impersonating God' (DHP, 54-55)? And, if so, there seems to be no reason why this need be an ordeal. The undecidable leap of the decision may well be experienced as an exhilarating moment of freedom, a moment ‗we mortal gods' (DHP, 56) relish. To say that a decision requires freedom and responsibility, and that one must exceed the order of the calculable to exercise the latter, only gets us to the claim that a decision requires the undecidable moment of an incalculable leap. Something more is needed for the further claim that such a leap is an ordeal. If we are to make sense of undecidability as an ordeal, we can not remain with the account of undecidability so far outlined. Something more must be going on.
In trying to get clear how the notion of ‗ordeal' functions in Derrida's account of undecidability two possibilities offer themselves. The first, more radical claim, would be to say that the ‗or-deal' of the undecidable, understood in terms of the kind ‗disquieting' experience characterised
above, is what any decision must go through. The second, more limited claim, would say that such an ordeal is the condition of not just any decision, but rather any just decision. That is to say, it is only once we enter the zone of a particular kind of decision-ethical, political, etc.,-that the undecidability that attends any decision is experienced as an ordeal. Although Derrida at times seems to suggest the former (FL, 24), as far as I can tell he never really offers an argument as to why any (i.e. each and every) decision would be an ordeal. Furthermore, if we were to go down the radical route it would be hard to avoid the charge of ‗dramatising our difficulties'. 
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Adapting a remark from Sartre, we wouldn't want to say that whenever I choose between a millefeuille and a chocolate éclair I go through an ordeal.
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So it seems there are good reasons to go with the more limited claim and to understand ‗or-deal' not as a structurally necessary moment of any decision, but as the necessary experience one goes through when trying to respond justly to the other. If we take the attempt to respond justly to the other as our basic ethical experience, then the ordeal of undecidability would be the condition of such experience. As limited claims go this is pretty far reaching. This would suggest that in order to regard ourselves as ethical agents we must see ourselves through this ordeal of undecidability. More than a mere polemic response to ethical-political surety, Derrida's account of the ordeal of undecidability is seeking to ‗make appear' an experience that is not some local imperfection or mistake that we could put right or free ourselves from, but a basic state for an ethical subject. Prior to responding to any problem, one must experience oneself as one who is vulnerable to the aporias revealed by the ordeal for it is this that opens up a space for ethics, what we might call a pre-ethical space of ethics. As Derrida notes: ‗we must not hide it [the aporia] from ourselves. I will even venture to say that ethics, politics, and responsibility…will only ever have begun with the experience…of the aporia'.
32
Returning to the context of the attempt to respond justly to the other, the reason for thinking that the ‗ordeal' of undecidability is the necessary experience of any just decision is that justice, 29 Indeed, the moment of suspension leaves itself open to the threat of the ‗the most perverse calculation' and so although a just decision requires a leap that exceeds law and calculation, it simultaneously requires calculation (FL, 28). Thus we are left in a paradoxical position: for a decision to be just it must be both ‗regulated and without regulation' (FL, 23). Responding justly must be without regulation so that the decision that responds to the singular other is not neutralised in advance by the mechanical application of a rule, but it must also be regulated insofar as a just decision must take account of existing laws and rules so as not to be left to arbitrary improvisations that can always be close ‗to the worst'. And so ‗incalculable justice requires us to calculate' (FL, 28) . It is here, in this ‗obligation' to calculate the incalculable, that the ‗ordeal' of the undecidable is undergone. As Derrida puts it:
The undecidable is not merely the oscillation…between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obligated-it is of obligation that we must speak-to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking into account of law and rules. A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable…might be legal; it would not be just (FL, 24, my emphasis) From this we can see that undecidability is not simply the structural necessity of making a leap that breaks with existing rules or norms, as the formal/structural account assumes. It should also be understood as the ordeal of having to respond to ‗antinomic injunctions' (Ps, 359) or a ‗con-tradictory obligation' (Ps, 360) that we unavoidably experience the moment it is a question of doing justice to the other. Rather than a leap that liberates my possibilities from constraining laws, this understanding of undecidability demands a decision which, in needing to be both regu-lated and unregulated, calculable and incalculable, is one we experience as an ‗im-possible' decision. 34 The ‗ghosts of departed wisdom' 35 mix with the ghosts of the undecidable.
Justice as the experience of interruption
So far I have argued that although the formal account of undecidability captures an aspect of undecidability, it fails to make sense of Derrida's repeated insistence on the ‗ordeal' of undecidability. I then tried to show that the latter is to be understood as the unavoidable experience of the ‗antinomic injunctions' any just decision places on us. Not only does this avoid the more decisionistic interpretations of the leap, but it also follows from the characterisation of justice as concerning the singularity of the other. And it is here that the experience as interruption comes in.
34 Derrida insists that ‗im-possibility' is not to be understood negatively: ‗For me, the experience of the impossible is not simply the experience of something not given in actuality, not accessible, but something through which a possi- anticipated, pre-understood' it (N, 194) and this means we miss the singularity of justice.
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To say that justice ‗concerns the other' does not capture the disturbing arriving of an interruption that opens up the demands of justice. Justice concerns the other, but not simply a determinable other that could be foreseen and assigned a place in the calculable horizon of generalised norms or rules. Rather, justice is a concern for the singularity of the other and this singularity 
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IV. Injunctions
A good conscience sleeps through thunder 37 Throughout Derrida's work we see him continually returning to the issue of a good conscience and issuing straightforward injunctions against it. 38 The clearest example of this is to be found in Derrida and why he thinks we should avoid it.
The OED explains ‗good conscience' as ‗a consciousness that one's acts, or one's moral state, are right'. Having a good conscience is a knowing: ‗My action was right', ‗I fulfilled my obligations', ‗I did the just thing'. Having a good conscience implies we are certain about our ethical decisions or state, it assumes that responding justly is something we can be sure about. This, for Derrida, is anything but responsible (see n.40 below). Put polemically, this assurance of a good conscience reassures us that we have assumed and fulfilled our ethical responsibilities, allowing us the peace of a ‗sweet sound sleep' 39 while the thunder continues to shake the world outside.
I say polemically because it seems clear that Derrida is engaged in a polemic. When he moves against the ‗moralizing moralists and good consciences who preach to us with assurance' about ethical and political responsibility, when he reminds the ‗knights of good conscience' that one cannot avoid or dissolve the conflictual obligation of doing justice to the other, that when it comes to our ethical experience we are all inhabitants of the ‗land of Moriah' every second of every day (GD, 67-69), the rhetoric deployed is clearly engaging a polemic against ethical/moral certainty. Similarly, the way in which he characterises the disquieting experience of the ordeal of undecidability seems aimed not merely at giving an analysis of a structural feature, but to reach out and shake the reader. When it comes to our basic ethical experience, Derrida seems to say, we cannot lie in the afternoon sun, shaded by the certainty of rules and norms, and enjoy that sweet sound sleep of a good conscience. Just as he seeks to remind the knights of good conscience that they are in the land of Moriah, so Derrida's characterisation of the ordeal of undecidability seeks to make us see that we are on the high wire, on a thunderous night not of our choosing, subject to the elements, with no light above us and nothing below. The only certainty here seems to be the insomnia of a bad conscience.
While the polemical element is clearly there in Derrida's account, it is not mere polemics. If having a good conscience is to be understood in terms of a knowledge or certainty that assures one that one has fulfilled one's ethical responsibilities, then from the account of the ordeal of undecidability as a necessary condition for responding justly to the other we can see why Derrida thinks having a good conscience is something that must be avoided when it comes to a just or ethical decision. Returning to the context of the injunction against a good conscience cited above, Derrida explains:
Good conscience as subjective certainty is incompatible with the absolute risk that…every responsible decision…must run. To protect the decision or the responsibility by knowledge, by some theoretical assurance, or by the certainty of being right…is to transform this experience into the deployment of a program, into the technical application of a rule or a norm, or into the subsumption of a determined case (AP, 19 -my emphasis).
Knowing or having certainty about responding justly may reassure one's conscience and that of others but it does so by dissolving the very ordeal (experience) of undecidability through which the possibility of doing justice is given. Without this ordeal, without this experience of the conflictual obligation or antinomic injunctions of justice opened up by the interruption of an incalculable other, ‗one might as well give up on…justice' (SM, 65). Behind Derrida's injunction against good conscience is the demand not to dissolve the ordeal of undecidability, not to close off this experience of having to respond, without assurance, to the interruption of an incalculable other.
Before fleshing out this demand a little more I want to respond to a possible objection. Might one not say that although a just decision must ‗go through' the ordeal of undecidability, once through the ordeal one can have the kind of certainty of having done the just thing that Derrida denies? Indeed, the very language of ‗going through' would seem to suggest an understanding of the ordeal as momentary. On this understanding, knowledge or certainty could be had about our ethical decisions, they could be calculated and determined with complete assurance, it is just that we lack the resources for this (i.e. time, knowledge) beforehand, hence the ordeal. Indeed, Derrida tell us that ‗justice…doesn't wait', and he insists that ‗a just decision is always required immediately' (FL, 26) . Perhaps the ordeal of undecidability emerges because of the empirical limitations we encounter in responding to the urgency of justice with a decision that ‗cannot furnish itself with infinite information and unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives' (FL, 26) . That is to say, the ordeal of undecidability would be the name for the experience of empirical limitations that we undergo in having to decide with finite resources. There would be nothing to rule out achieving certainty after the decision. And so the good conscience of having responded justly to the other remains compatible with the ordeal of undecidability we experience when trying to decide what would be the just response.
But this would reduce the ordeal of undecidability to the indecisiveness of an empirical moment and this, as we have seen, is what Derrida insists it is not. Derrida has already argued that a just decision cannot fall from a pre-existing rule or norm, or be the consequence of some determinate knowledge, because it is a response to the singularity of the other. So even if we had all resources at out disposal (FL, 26), ‗[c]enturies of preparatory reflection and theoretical deliberation,' the decision itself, if it is to be a just decision, must not be the consequence of such knowledge for one then applies or unfolds a program. And this, as we have seen, is incompatible with a just decision. As we outlined above, for Derrida a just, ethical or responsible decision presupposes a leap that is discontinuous with the order of knowledge, hence the characterisation of the ordeal as ‗acting in the night of non-knowledge and non-rule'. Unlimited resources may help us penetrate this night, but they will not dispel it.
If I could retrospectively dispel this night so that I now know I did the right thing, then this implies that the decision I faced was one with a knowable, correct outcome-I just needed to calculate it correctly. But if this is the case then the decision slips back into the order of the calculable that justice demanded it break with. What I faced was an incalculability that remained of the order of the calculable but ‗escape [d] it for contingent reasons, such as finitude, a limited power, etc ' (FWT, 49) . The upshot of this account seems to be that at no point can I be certain of the justness of my decision. Hence the haunting and lack of peace:
That is why the ordeal of the undecidable that…must be gone through…is never past or passed, it is not a surmounted or sublated (aufgenhoben) moment in the decision. The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost-but an essential ghost-in every decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs from within…any certitude…that would assure us of the justice of a decision (FL, 24) The ordeal of undecidability as Derrida understands it, then, cannot be understood as a momentary indetermination that we leave behind; rather it is an experience that remains to disturb any good conscience and keep us ethically off balance. Returning to the context of Derrida's injunction to avoid good conscience, the ordeal of undecidability is something we experience as an ‗in-terminable…remainder' (AP, 19). Our sleep will always be interrupted. The former suggests neutralising the ordeal in advance by applying norms in the certainty that the road ahead is clear (here I would not experience the ordeal). The latter suggests dissolving 40 See also OH, 41, 45, 81; Ps, 359, 361; N, 182, 232 the ordeal with the certainty of having taken the right road (here the ‗ordeal' would become a mere contingent moment in a calculable process). In both cases there is no interrupting arrival of the other. Suppressing the ordeal closes off the interruption of the other by transforming the conflictual obligation to respond justly to the other into a technical problem to be solved by the application of a rule or norm. This, in turn, would imply not only missing the ‗always unheard of singularity of the decision that needs to be made' (Ps, 360), but closing oneself off from the experience of the other as other. Here the other would never arrive. Forgetting the ordeal would do so by transforming the ordeal from an interminable experience that remains to disturb and affect me into a momentary indecisiveness that merely makes way for the decision that follows. Here I would not be affected by the ordeal and so would remain untouched by the other. And this is another way of saying the other does not arrive.
I suggested that the problem with having a good conscience was that it dissolved the ordeal of undecidability, and we can now see that the problem with the latter is that it closes off or denies the arriving of the singular other. Thus the demand not to dissolve the ordeal of undecidability, which I identified as motivating the injunctions against a good conscience, is itself motivated by the demand to remain open to the interruption of the singular other, to experience as interruption.
Insofar as closing oneself off from such interruption destroys the possibility of responding justly to the other, the demand to remain open to the arrival of the other would be an ethical demand.
‗Openness to the other', however, is probably not the most helpful way of phrasing this demand. Although most of the literature speaks of it in this way it leads to at least two problems. to the other cannot be an ethical principle since it is not a matter of choice'.
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A more promising route for understanding the demands of deconstruction might be to think of it in terms of maintaining the experience of undecidability (as interruption and ordeal) as this avoids the charge of impotence-such maintaining would require closure-and the suspicion that Derrida is trying to derive an ought from an is (or, at the very least, is confusing the two). I will briefly address both of these points, starting with Hägglund's point first.
Hägglund is right to say that openness to the other is not a matter of choice. However, I want to suggest that speaking of an ethical demand here is not incoherent. Although it may appear so, things become a little clearer if we recall that there are (at least) two layers to the structure of ex- suggests that we could indeed hide the aporia from ourselves (through suppressing or forgetting the ordeal). Given that the aporia is the ordeal we experience in having to respond to the conflictual obligations placed on us by the interruption of the other, hiding the aporia would be a way of denying the interruption of the other. In this respect it is probably more appropriate to describe this second layer as undeniable rather than unavoidable. So when Derrida insists that one cannot and should not close off the relation to the other, we have to bear in mind both the unavoidable and ‗undeniable' layers. Once this is recognised then one can make ethical demands here.
One could avoid the ambiguity that leads to the kind of response from Hägglund if we thought of the demand of deconstruction not so much in terms of ‗openness to the other' but rather as the demand to maintain the experience of undecidability (as interruption and ordeal) through which a
space is held open for the arriving of the other. This would be a demand not to forget or suppress this experience (R, 38). This demand not to deny this experience but to respond to and remember it would involve, to recall Wood, ‗the formation of complex dispositions' that would ‗bear witness to' such an experience, not as the memory of a past moment that disappears with the deci-sion that follows, but as an experience that remains and leaves one exposed to the interruption of the other.
We could think of this as being called upon to maintain an ethos of interruption. Such an ethos would involve ‗cultivating the difference-to-oneself…that constitutes identity' and developing a disposition of openness to the coming of the other, what Derrida describes as a ‗culture of oneself as the culture of the other' (OH, (10) (11) . From this we can perhaps glimpse a fourth injunction emerging, one that would orientate the maintaining of such an ethos and demand a commitment to preserving the possibility of the new, the heterogeneous-what we might call a ‗fidel-ity…to the to come' (R, 4).
'Prevent certain things from coming to pass' (N, 194)
By ‗to come' I understand experience as interruption, that is, the incalculable arriving of a singular other (and for Derrida the other refers always to who or what comes). This is captured by Derrida's discussion of the event in Rogues-which could equally be applied to the ‗to-come'-when he talks of an ‗incalculable irruption, the singular and exceptional alterity of what…or indeed of who…comes' (R, 128). Understood in this way, the ‗to-come' is not referring to the notyet-present of a future arrival or something we can have certainty about; it is not a modality of the present and neither is it of the order of knowledge but-and here is the second dimension to the to-come-instead belongs ‗to the time of the promise' (PF, 306). Whether it is of a reason to come (R, 148), a democracy to come (R, 90-91) or a friendship to come (R, 4), each is structured like a promise, never present but always remaining to be thought and re-thought. Being faithful to the to-come, so that one does not close off the space for the arriving of the other but instead creates the conditions for maintaining such a space, does not mean that one is left open to anything. One's fidelity, one's pledge or promise to maintain such a space itself calls for forms of action, practice and intervention. As Derrida insists, ‗a promise must promise to be kept, that is not to remain -spiritual‖ or -abstract,‖ but to produce events, new effective forms of action, practice, [and] organization' (SM, 89). The affirmation of such an ethos thus requires taking a position; without the latter the former remains spiritual, abstract. Out of a fidelity to the to-come one must close off in the face of an arriving that would destroy the very space for the interruption of the other (N, 25). The demand to maintain a space for the arriving of the other thus cannot be reduced to the ‗moralizing and unpalatable stereotype' of mere openness that Derrida feared (N, 194) , nor the impotence in deciding which others to welcome that Laclau and Wolin suspect. Instead it demands that we calculate in order to prevent the emergence of discourses that close the to-come. think there is a way, overlooked by Hägglund, of making sense of this. Derrida identifies these systems not in terms of being closed but rather as systems that ‗close and close themselves off from' the coming of the other. That is to say, these systems are marked by a general discourse of closing off, not a state of being closed. That structurally they can never be closed in no way precludes one from speaking of these as systems of closing off. What is crucial here is to appreciate the unavoidable/undeniable layers at work -structurally every system is unavoidably open, but the undeniable layer points to the possibility of systems constructing themselves around denying, suppressing or closing themselves off from this openness. Totalitarian regimes are such systems (N, 182). Democracy, by contrast, is a system structured around openness, however imperfectly realised and despite the alibis of actually existing democracies (for example through the institutionalisation of contestation, debate, interminable self-criticizability, intrinsic historicity and so forth. [See N, 194; R, 25, ). It is at this level that Derrida's distinction between ‗good' or ‗bad' systems is operating, and once we take this into account then there is no reason why the (necessary) openness of systems renders normative claims against systems or discourses of closing off a non-starter.
the -anything whatsoever‖' (SM, 168). For this ‗anything whatsoever' harbours behind it ‗those too familiar ghosts, the very ones we must practice recognizing' (SM, 168). These are ghosts who bring with them systems that ‗close themselves off from the coming of the other' (N, 182).
Here, at the very moment when he rejects ‗the anything whatsoever' reading of deconstruction, when he demands vigilance with regard to those others who presumably we must not remain open to, Derrida talks of a practice of recognizing. Recognising these others is something we must practice doing. A similar demand is made in OH where Derrida insists that we must anticipate and not simply give ourselves over to the rhetoric of the absolutely new, for under this banner of the absolutely new ‗we can fear seeing return the phantoms of the worst'. Thus one ‗must' be suspicious of the ‗exposure to what would no longer be identifiable at all' and ‗learn to identify' these ghosts in all their guises (OH, 18, 77) .
Understood in these terms, deconstruction is not an ‗anything whatsoever' openness but a complex disposition that seeks to hold open a space for a relation to the other. And in doing so, deconstruction demands that we oppose and attempt to prevent the arrival of that which would close off such a space. ‗We must not be open to whatever comes' (PM, 11). That is to say, the ethico-political experience of deconstruction does not remain impotent; it intervenes in order to maintain an ethos of interruption.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to correct the idea that ‗the experience of undecidability' refers simply to a structural openness by showing (i) that from the early work through to the later work Derrida has been engaged in an attempt to rearticulate the concept of experience in a way that brings out the difference at the heart of self-presence and our ‗traumatic' relation to the other; (ii) that there is a particular understanding of undecidability as an ordeal that (a) is a response to the experience 46 of an conflictual obligation and so already situates us in the zone of a particular kind of ethicopolitical decision and (b) is the condition of our basic ethical experience of trying to respond justly to the other; (iii) that experience as interruption is what opens up the ordeal of undecidability and given that such an ordeal is necessary for any just decision, justice would not be possible without such an experience. From this I then tried to show that this account leads to a series of injunctions which I summarised as the demand to maintain an ethos of interruption. Understood in this way, the experience of undecidability, far from signalling a mere structural openness that is ethically impotent and politically naïve, turns out to be a crucial aspect of our most basic ethical experience of doing justice to the other, and one which intervenes in a normatively orientated way.
